Who’s Who

Soahib Bhutta

John Bray

Evan Butts
Evan Butts received a B.A. in Cognitive Science from the University of Georgia in 2007, where he was elected into the Phi Beta Kappa Honor Society. Directly after graduating from UGA, he came to study at Edinburgh for an MSc in ‘Mind, Language and Embodied Cognition’, and receives it in December 2008. He has stayed at Edinburgh to pursue a PhD, the topic of which is to explore the epistemological ramifications of accepting Extended Mind results. He studies under Andy Clark and Duncan Pritchard. Evan is a recipient of the ORS and ORS-linked Scholarships.

Adam Carter

Matthew Chrisman
Dr. Chrisman joined the department in August 2006 after finishing his Ph.D. at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. In conjunction with his work in ethics, he is interested in the nature of epistemic normativity and the semantics of knowledge attributions. His publications in epistemology include ‘From Epistemic Contextualism to Epistemic Expressivism’ (Philosophical Studies, 2007) and ‘Ought to Believe’ (Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming).

Jamie Collin

Rachel Fairnie

Emma Gordon

Lottie Hanson

Jesper Kallestrup
Dr. Kallestrup joined the department in September 2005 and is also an associate fellow of Arche at the university of St. Andrews. In epistemology he has worked extensively on epistemological contextualism, scepticism, and various epistemic paradoxes. His publications in epistemology include ‘Knowledge-Wh and the Problem of Convergent Knowledge’ (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming). He is currently working on a monograph which examines, amongst other things, various epistemological implications of semantic externalism.

Eric Kerr
Eric studied law and philosophy at the University of Aberdeen before beginning his PhD at Edinburgh in 2008. His doctoral research is primarily focused upon contextualist epistemologies in scientific practice.

Joseph Kuntz

Christos Kyriacou
Christos’ thesis concerns the semantics of propositional sentences predicating ‘is epistemically justified’. He criticises referential semantics and attempts to construct a norm-expressivist alternative. Previous to his PhD, he studied Philosophy and Sociology in Cyprus, before taking an Msc in Edinburgh.

Conor McHugh
Conor finished his PhD in 2008. His thesis was on the epistemology of self-knowledge
of conscious states and episodes. His other interests include epistemic normativity and
perceptual epistemology, as well as issues in philosophy of mind and philosophy of
action. His publications include “Self-Knowledge and the KK Principle” (Synthese,
forthcoming). He is currently teaching honours courses on Philosophy of Psychology and
Self, Agency and the Will, as well as lecturing in epistemology.

Carl Messenger
Carl received his BA in Philosophy from the University of Lancaster and an MLitt in Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind from the University of Stirling before beginning his PhD at Edinburgh in 2008. His doctoral research examines the problem of radical scepticism. For the academic year 2008-09 he is a Sir Richard Stapley Educational Trust Scholar.

Duncan Pritchard
Professor Pritchard joined the department in July 2007. He has worked extensively in epistemology, covering all the main topics in this area, including: the problem of scepticism, the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction; the rationality of religious belief; testimony; the relationship between epistemic and content externalism; virtue epistemology; epistemic value; modal epistemology; the history of scepticism; and epistemological contextualism. His publications include Epistemic Luck (Oxford UP, 2005) and What Is This Thing Called Knowledge? (Routledge, 2006).

Crispin Wright
Professor Wright (NYU/St. Andrews) is an honorary professorial fellow in the Department. While he has published in all the major areas of philosophy, his main focus in recent work has been on issues in epistemology. His recent books include Rails to Infinity (Harvard UP, 2001), and Saving the Differences (Harvard UP, 2003).

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